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Introduction
In his award-winning memoir Out of  Place,1 the Palestinian-American critic 
Edward W. Said suggests a twofold connotation of  the idea of  exile. On the 
one hand, rather obviously, it points to a political condition—the physical 
reality of  stateless refugees, of  violent dispossession, of  tragic uprootedness. 
On the other, the notion exile names “a state of  being, a critical mode of  
standing apart from dominant ideologies, of  being scattered in the world 
yet ultimately not belonging to it.”2 The implied posture is one of  dissent, 
one that stands in necessary tension with dominant codings of  reality and 
expressions of  “manufactured consent.” Such exilic consciousness, Said 
suggests, is an instance of  intellectual dislocation, a state of  liminality defi ned 
as the condition of  “betwixt and between”;3 a state where one is “neither 
completely at one with the new setting nor fully disencumbered of  the old, 
beset with half-involvements and half-detachments, nostalgic and sentimental 
on one level, an adept mimic or a secret outcast on another.”4 
Postcolonial and cultural studies in particular have picked up on this latter 
meaning of  exilic existence, recognizing in it a potent tool for the mining of  
colonial/imperial artifacts often embedded in political, religious, intellectual, 
and popular-level discourse. In such contexts, the language of  diaspora, 
marginality, oppositional culture, and so on, perform the role of  a critical 
vantage point—along the lines of  Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of  utopia as 
a form of  critical distance5—for the purpose of  protest, resistance, and the 
1Edward W. Said, Out of  Place: A Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1999). For this 
reference to Said I am indebted to Alain Epp Weaver, States of  Exile: Visions of  Diaspora, 
Witness, and Return (Scottdale, PA: Herald, 2008), 15.
2Weaver, 15. 
3See Victor Turner, “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites De 
Passage,” in The Forest of  Symbols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967). 
4Edward W. Said, Representations of  the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (New 
York: Vintage, 1996), 49.
5See Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). Ricoeur claims that utopian visions allow us to imagine a “no place,” a 
“ghost city,” that offers “an exterior glance” on our reality. He asks, “Is not utopia—this 
leap outside—the way in which we radically re-think what is family, what is consumption, 
what is authority, what is religion, and so on? Does not the fantasy of  an alternative society 
and its exteriorization ‘nowhere’ work as one of  the most formidable contestations of  
what is?” The affi rmation of  utopian horizons, then, allows us to put our own culture 
“at a distance.” They provide us with a starting point from which to judge ourselves and 
others whom we encounter in the present or the past. Utopian horizons are not products 
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nurture of  a subversive imagination “set against Western political, intellectual 
and academic hegemony and its protocol of  objective knowledge.”6
In this paper, I want to build on such delineations of  the exile metaphor 
by both appropriating and nudging it into a slightly different direction. 
With that in mind, three specifi c concerns will be addressed in the course 
of  our discussion. First, I will explore how the concepts of  exile, diaspora, 
and liminality might help us rethink, or rather restate, certain parameters 
of  Adventist ecclesial identity and remnant theology. I consider this to be 
of  some importance as current debates in the Adventist faith community 
about creation, homosexuality, church-state relations, and so on are never 
simply discussions about doctrinal matters. Namely, the way one goes about 
addressing and resolving these material questions—be it the revising of  
fundamental beliefs or the way the bane of  heterodoxy is dealt with—always 
reveals, implicitly and explicitly, different assumptions at work concerning 
authority structures, “regimes of  truth” (M. Foucault), boundary crafting, 
differentiation, and power, in turn shaping and informing Adventist theology 
and praxis. 
Second, I want to engage the claim that the current heterogeneity of  the 
“Adventist experience,” in all of  its protean manifestations, is by defi nition 
advantageous and worthy of  affi rmation. Justifi cations for the benefi cence 
of  such pluriformity come in a variety of  guises. The need for tolerance, 
assertions of  the postmodern pastiche, rejections of  totality and uniformity, 
subscriptions to “weak” epistemological accounts, and the privileging of  
unconditional and nonjudgmental hospitality as “fi rst theology” are but some 
of  the reasons people resort to in agitating for a “broadening” of  Adventism. 
In light of  that, I am interested in how such sentiments correlate to the need 
for fostering a remnant exilic consciousness that is both prophetic in nature 
and obedient to the presence of  Christ in this world.
This leads me to the third and fi nal concern, namely, the broader aim of  
articulating the socioethical dimensions of  Adventist remnant theology vis-
à-vis various ideological forces that frame and justify the various “givens” of  
our current age. Simply put, I am interested in what it means to be a follower 
of  Christ at a time when our cultural discourse is dominated by concurrent 
appeals to violence, exclusion, ethnocentrism, and ethical emotivism. Stated 
even plainer, what shape of  living does the confession “Maranatha” point us 
to as a community of  faith inhabiting the postmodern condition, and how 
does that correlate to some of  the points raised above?
of  objective knowledge, known with scientifi c certitude, but products of  desire rooted 
in faith and dreams of  what might be” (ibid., 16-17). I should add that the literature on 
the problem of  utopia is immense. For a good introduction to these issues, see Ruth 
Levitas, The Concept of  Utopia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990). Note also Tom 
Moylan, Scraps of  the Untainted Sky (Boulder: Westview, 2000); Tom Moylan and Jamie 
Owen Daniel, eds., Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch (London: Verso, 1997).
6Robert Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 
65.
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I am well aware that these are incredibly complicated issues and that one 
needs to walk a fi ne line between cautious dialogue and fi rmness of  assertion. 
I trust that the following pages will speak to my intention in doing so.
Elect (and Engaged) Exiles
The privileging of  the exile metaphor as a linguistic and epistemological tool 
for the deconstruction of  various forms of  “royal consciousness”7 has ample 
biblical warrants. While this thematic cannot be explored at any considerable 
length here,8 I do wish to gesture, however briefl y, toward 1 Peter. In particular, 
I want to point to the opening statement of  the epistle—“Peter, an apostle 
of  Jesus Christ, to those who are elect exiles of  the diaspora”—that sets 
the stage for an interlacing tour de force of  theological themes and pastoral 
exhortations.9 I side with those scholars who see the idea of  “foreignness” 
as the letter’s “controlling metaphor”10 and the essential description of  
what it means to be a Christian.11 In contrast to the purely transcendental 
7On the idea of  “royal consciousness,” see Walter Brueggemann, The Prophetic 
Imagination, 2d ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), chap. 2.
8Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, A Biblical Theology of  Exile (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2002) is a good resource for exploring this issue. See also Ralph W. Klein, Israel in Exile: 
A Theological Interpretation, 2d ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1979).
9For a good discussion of  this issue, see Miroslav Volf, Captive to the Word of  God: 
Engaging the Scriptures for Contemporary Theological Refl ection (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 
chap. 3. I credit Volf  for providing the initial impetus for my refl ections on 1 Peter.
10Troy W. Martin, Metaphor and Composition in 1 Peters, SBLDS 131 (Atlanta: 
Scholars, 1992), 131; quoted in Joel B. Green, “Living as Exiles: The Church in the 
Diaspora in 1 Peter,” in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New Testament, ed. K. E. Brower 
and Andy Johnson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 314. See also Reinhard Feldmeier, 
The First Letter of  Peter: A Commentary on the Greek Text, trans. Peter H. Davis (Waco: 
Baylor University Press, 2008); Miroslav Volf, Free of  Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a 
Culture Stripped of  Grace (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005), chap. 3; Douglas Harink, 1 
and 2 Peter (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2009). For a helpful account of  the Jewish diaspora 
in the period of  1 Peter, see Erich S. Gruen, Diaspora: Jews Amidst Greeks and Romans 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).
11Feldmeier, 1. Admittedly, the clause “eklektois parepidemois diasporas” has proved 
to be a matter of  some contention among biblical scholars. One of  the debated issues 
is whether parepidemos and paroikos (strangers, aliens, sojourners) refer exclusively to 
the experiential/sociological location of  the epistle’s recipients before or after their 
conversion. Furthermore, the question is raised whether the designation has a 
theological signifi cance. It is impossible to outline here the fi ner points of  this debate 
except to say that I side with those interpreters who see those two perspectives as 
mutually informing. Certainly, Peter’s audience experienced persecution and rejection 
by “all social strata of  the population” that saw Christians as a “foreign body that 
through its very existence jeopardized their societal foundations, that through its 
expansion disturbed peace and order and so was subversive” (Harink, 9). At the same 
time, I believe that the implied sociological reality also serves as a springboard from 
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or existential portrayals of  exilic imagery found in the writings of  Albert 
Camus,12 Emmanuel Levinas,13 and Georg Lukacs,14 Peter structures his exilic 
ecclesiology along key theological categories, two of  which are of  particular 
signifi cance for my argument here. First, with the term eklektois (chosen, 
elect) Peter signals that the origins of  the church are set squarely within God’s 
Trinitarian history (1:2). The setting-apartness, therefore, is not a matter of  
human self-realization or some generic sense of  Unheimlichkeit or not-being-
at-home (M. Heidegger),15 but rather a result of  God’s prevenient grace as 
evidenced in “God with us.” Second, it is through the “sanctifi cation of  the 
Spirit” (en hagiasmo pneumatos) that the bond between “the election and the 
holiness of  the people of  God” is being sustained “by distinguishing the 
people of  God from other peoples.”16 It is thus God’s purposiveness in history 
that circumscribes and determines the character of  “otherness” or distance. 
The nature of  exilic subversion, therefore, is not a matter of  posh faddism, or 
avant-garde “prophetic” posturing, or a sophomoric clamor for authenticity; 
it is simply the external manifestation of  the internal acquiescence to the 
action and call of  God in a world that doesn’t yet know Jesus. 
Second, Peter’s exilic ecclesiology is fundamentally apocalyptic in that 
the notion of  foreignness “is based in the eschatological existence of  the 
believers”17 (1:3, 23; 2:2). Exilic existence, on Peter’s terms, transgresses the 
stultifying historicism as operative, for example, in G. F. Hegel and Ernst 
Troeltsch, where the “the idea of  a cosmic-historical event of  God’s coming 
kingdom as a . . . qualitative determination of  history is . . . rejected.”18 According 
to such historicist strictures, “Christianity cannot be conceived as standing 
apart from this historical development”; it can but perform an ideological 
function of  propping up and supporting regnant sociopolitical forces that 
always seek to project an aura of  inevitability through a mixed apparatus of  
mythological self-descriptions, fear-mongering, and propagandistic rhetoric. 
which Peter constructs “dogmatic ecclesiology” (ibid.); a very specifi c “messianic 
politics” that is a socioethical embodiment of  the way of  Jesus patterned after Jewish 
diasporic existence.
12See, e.g., Albert Camus, The Plague, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 
1991), part 4.
13For a helpful treatment of  the idea of  exile in Levinas, see Abi Doukhan, “From 
Exile to Hospitality: A Key to the Philosophy of  Emmanuel Levinas,” Philosophy Today 
54/3 (2010): 235-246.
14See, e.g., Georg Lukacs, Theory of  the Novel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), 41.
15For Martin Heidegger’s understanding of  that term, see, e.g., Introduction to 
Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), 158-176, 178.
16Harink, 41.
17Ibid., 15.
18Nathan Kerr, Christ, History, and Apocalyptic: The Politics of  Christian Mission 
(Eugene: Cascade, 2009), 40.
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Not so in 1 Peter, however. There an “ethics of  secession”19 in respect to such 
forces is engendered and sustained by a specifi c understanding of  Christian 
apocalyptic—a reading of  history in light of  the singularity and lordship of  
Jesus Christ in which God breaks into and opens up history to God’s own 
reality. Such Christian apocalyptic, in turn, performs the function of  a critical 
imagination reminiscent of  the Foucauldian criticism of  historical necessity 
and normalcy. While such an “apocalyptic politics” assumes the reality of  
God’s agency in this world in a way that Foucault’s archeological method 
clearly does not, the aim is structurally very similar—the articulation of  a 
counter-history and a counter-memory with an alternative coding of  power 
and necessity embedded in the “regimes of  truth.” Such an anticipatory 
consciousness is a poetic imagination or productive fantasy of  sorts, one 
that helps human agents envision—returning to Ricoeur’s words above—
an alternative utopian (or rather heterotopian) standpoint. Rather than 
being a poison of  otherworldly hopes (Nietzsche),20 therefore, the actuality 
of  Christ’s messianic interruption is inducting believers into the school of  
ocular conversion or perspectival awakening. As Brian J. Walsh and Sylvia C. 
Keesmaat put it: 
We don’t allow the empire to captivate our imagination and set the final 
terms of  our praxis in the world, because we can see a kingdom that is 
alternative to the empire. And we don’t allow the empire to close down 
the possibilities of  the future for us, because we can see a future in which 
what is hidden is revealed—both Christ’s rule and our own completion and 
fullness. Such a vision provides a hope that not only is subversive to the 
empire but also provides a radical direction for Christian praxis.21 
1 Peter certainly attests to this. Indeed, one could go on to further 
illustrate how the notion of  foreignness serves as a regulative idea in the epistle 
and the way it illuminates a wide range of  topics in ecclesiology, discipleship, 
and prophetic witness to the culture at large. Although there is no space 
to discuss it in detail here, I highlight Peter’s exile theme as the backdrop 
19See Brian J. Walsh and Sylvia C. Keesmaat, Colossians Remixed: Subverting the 
Empire (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004), 9.
20See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1976), 125.
21Walsh and Keesmaat, 156. Space does not allow for deeper exploration of  the 
language of  “eventual rupture” operative in thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, Giorgio 
Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek. According to Žižek, e.g., Christianity entails 
“psycho-social grounds for a radical break with the past and a reinvention of  the self,” 
and by extension an “interruption into the pagan cycle of  submission and surrender 
to the higher powers of  destiny and fate.” Christianity thus stands in clear contrast 
to “the ultimate horizon of  pagan wisdom, the coincidence of  opposites.” It “is the 
miraculous Event that disturbs the balance of  the One-All; it is the violent intrusion 
of  Difference that precisely throws the balanced circuit of  the universe off  the rails” (The 
Fragile Absolute, or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? [New York: Verso, 
2000], 121).
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for my discussion of  John Howard Yoder, whose creative appropriation 
of  exile language might help in (re)articulating an Adventist theopolitics—
“theopolitics” here standing for the idea of  the church as a “structured social 
body”22 shaped by God’s apocalyptic inbreak.
John Howard Yoder’s Body Politic
In approaching Yoder’s account of  ecclesial liminality, one is struck by the 
extent to which his conceptualization mirrors the marginality discourse of  
postcolonial criticism and its stress on intellectual and moral distance from 
“imperial normativity.”23 The irony of  such a resemblance is not easily lost 
here, as it is precisely Christianity that frequently serves as a prime culprit 
in those forms of  ideological criticism. In that sense, seeing Yoder’s sly 
appropriation of  the given critical apparatus for his own rhetorical purposes is 
lusciously ingenious. And yet, in order to delineate his position, Yoder draws 
on intellectual resources that are quite different. Unlike Said, and in tune 
with 1 Peter, for example, Yoder focuses most intently on diasporic Judaism 
from the OT and the Second Temple period as the normative description 
of  “unsettled peoplehood” and of  “not being in charge.”24 Diaspora Jewish 
communities, suggests Yoder, embodied “mission without provincialism, 
cosmopolitanism without empire,”25 while at the same time nurturing a 
Jeremian mode of  embodied witness as a dialectical instance of  religious 
22John Howard Yoder, Body Politics: Five Practices of  the Christian Community before the 
Watching World (Scottdale, PA: Herald, 1992), viii.
23For recent attempts to re-read Yoder in the light of, e.g., poststructuralism and 
postcolonialism, see Peter Dula and Chris K. Huebner, eds., The New Yoder (Eugene: 
Cascade, 2010).
24Yoder’s importance to the Jewish-Christian dialogue has been a matter of  
sustained attention. While his approach has been lauded for breaking new ground 
in this regard, it is also the case that his description of  the diaspora as the normative 
Jewish experience has been charged with a measure of  tendentiousness. Some have 
suggested that his reduction of  “true Judaism” to that of  a “non-violent minority” 
is itself  a Constantinian or colonial move, an artifi cial postulation of  an essence 
that belies historical reality and the full gamut of  Jewish self-understanding. See, 
e.g., Daniel Boyarin, “Judaism as a Free Church: Footnotes to John Howard Yoder’s 
The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited,” in The New Yoder, ed. Peter Dula and Chris K. 
Huebner (Eugene: Cascade, 2010). Or take Peter Ochs’s objection that Yoder operates 
altogether too much on the level of  conceptual “purisms” (“Editor’s Introduction,” in 
The Jewish Christian Schism Revisited, by John Howard Yoder, ed. Michael G. Cartwright 
and Peter Ochs [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 5). Additionally, there have been 
worries that accounts along the lines of  Yoder have the tendency of  co-opting the 
language of  diaspora as a uniquely Jewish experience. For such a critique, see Jonathan 
Boyarin and Daniel Boyarin, Powers of  Diaspora: Two Essays on the Relevance of  Jewish 
Culture (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2002), 1-33. 
25John Howard Yoder, The Jewish Christian Schism Revisited, ed. Michael G. 
Cartwright and Peter Ochs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 75. 
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countertestimony, attesting to the “practical viability of  the ethics of  Jeremiah 
and Jesus.” That is, by the nurturing of  a decentralized, nonsacerdotal, and 
nonhierarchical form of  diasporic existence,26 “Jews of  the Diaspora were 
for over a millennium the closest thing to the ethic of  Jesus existing on any 
signifi cant scale anywhere in Christendom”;27 the clearest enactment of  the 
vocation of  galut (exile) as a form of  nonviolent witness.
For Yoder, then, the idea of  exilic existence is that account of  the 
church that deconstructs the imperial logic of  Constantinianism28—Yoder’s 
preferred term for the symbiotic relationship of  church and “world” or 
“structured unbelief ”—and the corollary de-Judaization of  Christianity29 in 
favor of  casting the remnant people as a peaceable, eschatologically shaped 
altera civitas rooted in the election of  God. Echoing Stanley Hauerwas’s often 
repeated adage that the church is a social ethic, Yoder further contends that 
“there must be a critical mass of  like-minded people, sustaining one another 
in the world view they have given themselves to. . . . The church is the seed 
bed where valid dissent can sprout, where the alternative world view can be 
rehearsed.”30
However, such a notion of  “exilic consciousness” seems to catapult us into 
some rather treacherous territory. Neo-Nietzschean genealogies, indictments 
of  monotheisms and their proclivities to exclusion, historiographic accounts 
of  symbolic and structural violence, personal/historical anecdotes of  this or 
that exclusion, sordid legacies of  legalistic strictures—these are just some 
elements informing the complex nexus of  intellectual concepts and experiential 
realities that present a veritable minefi eld in this regard. How does Yoder, 
then, or anyone else for that matter, propose to get away with arguing for 
the necessity of  “separation,” “difference,” and “judgment” in an age that is 
26See, e.g., ibid., 171. For a Jewish account that in some facets comes remarkably 
close to Yoder’s proposal, see Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of  
Identity (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1994).
27Ibid., 81-82.
28For a helpful treatment of  Yoder’s understanding of  Constantinianism, see 
Michael G. Cartwright, “Radical Reform, Radical Catholicity: John Howard Yoder’s 
Vision of  the Faithful Church,” in The Jewish Christian Schism Revisited, by John Howard 
Yoder, ed. Michael G. Cartwright and Peter Ochs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 
5-14. See also Craig A. Carter, The Politics of  the Cross: The Theology and Social Ethics of  
John Howard Yoder (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001), 155-178.
29Rodney Stark notes the following: “Constantine destroyed its most attractive 
and dynamic aspects, turning a high-intensity, grassroots movement into an arrogant 
institution controlled by an elite who often managed to be both brutal and lax” (For 
the Glory of  God: How Monotheism Led to Reformation, Science, Witch-Hunts and the End of  
Slavery [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003], 33). For an account of  the “Fall” 
of  Christianity consisting in the loss of  “certain elements of  the Jewish heritage,” see 
Yoder, The Jewish Christian Schism Revisited, 121; see also chap. 1.
30John Howard Yoder, “Christianity and Protest in America” (Unpublished 
lecture, 1991).
214 SEMINARY STUDIES 50 (AUTUMN 2012)
hyperallergic to anything even hinting at “coercive assignments” (Foucault),31 
i.e., the spectacle of  symbolic violence through various modalities of  the in/
out language? In other words, how can such a discourse and related practice 
be anything other than a form of  negative deviance, in the Durkheimian sense 
of  the term, as that which is outside of  culturally defi ned normalcy?
While these are indeed serious concerns, I do believe that Yoder goes 
a long way in addressing them via two strands of  argumentation. First, his 
insistence on the practice of  nonviolence and the church’s need to restrain 
itself  from putting “handles” on history—assenting to compromise, 
effectiveness, and coercion in order to move history in the “right direction”— 
is a rhetorical strategy that hedges his understanding of  exilic existence against 
different forms of  totality. In the same way that Levinas posits ethics as the 
“fi rst philosophy”—the idea that the acceptance of  the alterity of  the other 
precedes any attempts to ontologize the human person—so too Yoder’s stress 
on nonviolence serves a fundamentally regulative function. That is, pacifi sm 
is not just a socioethical strategy, but also a description of  an irrevocable, a 
priori epistemological stance that cannot be suspended by clamors, though 
not altogether wrong ones, for doctrinal purity. It is that commitment that 
shields Yoder’s proposal from tiresome inanities along the lines of, “Beliefs 
in absolutes and beliefs in one’s chosenness always result in things like people 
fl ying planes into buildings.” An absolute commitment to nonviolence—to the 
Sermon on the Mount and the resulting politics of  Jesus—is the nonnegotiable, 
indissoluble “fi rst philosophy” in Yoder’s vision of  reality. 
Consequently, and this is the second point, Yoder offers an account of  
the church’s distinctiveness from the world that eschews, or aims at doing 
so, the twin charges of  irresponsible separatism on one hand and a drooling 
superiority complex on the other. This is because for Yoder the distinctiveness 
of  the church emerges precisely at the point of  the church’s transformed 
involvement with the life of  the world, an involvement rightly characterized 
as an “exceptionally normal quality of  humanness to which the community 
is committed.” The church is most visible, most distinct precisely at the point 
that it is the most human, involving itself  in the sufferings and sorrows of  
the world in the pattern of  Christ’s kenotic, self-giving love. The nature of  
exilic difference, therefore, “is not a cultic or ritual separation, but rather a 
nonconformed quality of  (‘secular’) involvement in the life of  the world.”32 
And yet, Yoder recognizes, rightly in my estimation, that the very 
language of  “prophetic challenge,” “subversive Christianity,” “diaspora 
consciousness,” “anarchic resistance,” and so on, by defi nition implies some 
measure of  adjudication and differentiation and thus a rejection of  unqualifi ed 
inclusiveness. In that sense, I want to suggest that Foucault’s “aesthetics of  
existence” and the tragic politics it informs is not suffi ciently robust in that 
31Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, 
2d ed. (New York: Vintage, 1995), 199ff.
32John Howard Yoder, The Politics of  Jesus, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1994), 39.
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regard.33 After all, the language of  “mutually enriching plurality” or “benefi cial 
dialectics” or “charitable inclusiveness” or “weak thought” (Vattimo) can only 
carry us a certain way before falling prey to the claws of  the reductio ad absurdum 
fallacy, not to mention idolatry and moral paralysis. As Miroslav Volf  puts 
it, “intelligent struggle against exclusion demands categories and normative 
criteria that enable us to distinguish between repressive identities and practices 
that should be subverted and nonrepressive ones that should be affi rmed.” 
To state it differently, “without use of  symbolic codes, without judgments, all 
we would have is the wild fl ow of  desire.” It must be recognized that “there 
are incommensurable perspectives that stubbornly refuse to be dissolved in 
a peaceful synthesis.”34 It seems to me that Volf  is correct in this assessment 
given that the very language of  status confessionis, the notion that there are 
certain beliefs on which the church stands or falls, implies the necessity, as the 
history of  Christianity clearly teaches us, of  saying or naming “nays.”
Demarcating Adventist Theopolitics
Even such a pared-down summation of  Yoder’s approach potentially exposes 
current tendencies to extol Adventist heterogeneity in an unrestrained sort of  
way—the idea that all forms of  Adventist expression lead to the enrichment 
of  the whole—often in the name of  some thinned-out notion of  grace or 
benign pluralism, as being fundamentally misguided. After all, wouldn’t such 
a cavalier apotheosis of  unlimited heterogeneity assure, at some point, the 
church’s complicity with the ideological blind-spots of  a given age? Wouldn’t 
such a posture be but a form of  intellectual kitsch, a sentimentality of  “sweet 
emotion” that bandies about the language of  “tolerance” and “diversity” in 
a way that is self-cancelling and élan-sapping?35 In sum, wouldn’t that entail a 
denial of  the church’s calling to be a sign of  the kingdom of  God; a kingdom 
that has a specifi c shape, a specifi c content, a specifi c message about “this 
but not that,” and thus comes—and yes, this needs to be said—in the shape 
of  God’s judgment (krisis) against all forms of  idolatry and “false fi elds of  
perception?”36 As Bonhoeffer argues: 
[The church] has to make itself  distinct and to be a community which 
hears the Apocalypse. It has to testify to its alien nature and to resist 
the false principle of  inner-worldliness. Friendship between the church 
and the world is not normal, but abnormal. The community must suffer 
33David Toole presents a good comparison between Foucault’s “tragic politics” 
and Yoder’s “apocalyptic politics” in his Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Refl ections 
on Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse (Boulder: Westview, 1998).
34Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of  Identity, Otherness, 
and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 65, 289-290, 52.
35For a good treatment of  this theme, see Robert Solomon, “On Kitsch and 
Sentimentality,” Journal of  Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (Winter 1991): 1-14.
36Brueggemann, 1. See also Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), 27-29.
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like Christ, without wonderment. The cross stands visibly over the 
community.37 
Perhaps one example from the current debate on the morality of  enhanced 
interrogation methods could serve to illustrate my point. According to the 
Pew Forum torture poll conducted in 2009,38 62 percent of  white evangelical 
Protestants believe “the use of  torture against suspected terrorists to gain 
important information” to be often or sometimes justifi ed. In response, David 
Gushee published a lament addressed to Jesus in which he mourned the moral 
obtuseness of  much of  contemporary Christianity. Here are his concluding 
words: 
There are times when a church so badly misunderstands what it means to be 
church that it must be repudiated as fundamentally ungodly, fundamentally 
a negation of  true Christianity. . . . I believe this is one such moment. Any 
church—congregation, parachurch organization, denomination, or group 
of  individual Christians—that supports torture has violated its confessed 
allegiance to you and can no longer be considered part of  your true church. 
Let them be anathema.39 
The way in which Adventists are able to retain, recapture, and practice the 
language of  anathema, that is, the way they go about construing their own approach 
to differentiation, is one of  the key issues, I believe, confronting Adventism 
today. After all, both the Radical Reformation and Adventism believe, contra 
Augustine’s notion of  indefectibility of  the church, that the church is radically 
defectible40 and that such defectibility in principle can and must be named.41 
But how precisely is that supposed to work? Who exactly should be in charge 
of  drawing or naming these boundaries? What about “policing” them? What 
sort of  “enforcement” is being implied here? Isn’t such a separatist language 
but another form of  ecclesiological monophysitism, an idealistic account of  
the church as the divine agent that is a mere abstraction from reality? More 
pointedly, doesn’t the stress on the exilic aspect of  the church’s identity only 
acerbate a regressive, narcissistically-infl ected refl ex, one that is feeding on 
Adventism’s separatist streak with all of  its fundamentalist trappings?
To respond to these questions at any signifi cant length is simply 
impossible here. Still, I want to propose certain directives entailed in Yoder’s 
37Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords, ed. Edwin Robertson (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1965), 324.
38See http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/The-Religious-Dimensions-
of-the-Torture-Debate.aspx.
39David P. Gushee, “A Christian’s Lament over the Pew Torture Poll” (http://
www.abpnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4052&Itemid
=9, accessed 5 September 2011). William T. Cavanaugh observes: “As the case of  
Chile makes clear, a church that appears to include torturers and tortured alike without 
judgment has lost its ability to witness to the world” (Migrations of  the Holy: God, State, 
and the Political Meaning of  the Church [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011], 152).
40Yoder, The Jewish Christian Schism Revisited, 122, 137.
41Cavanaugh, 152.
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diasporic ecclesiology and the way such directives might be of  help for the 
(re)construal of  Adventist theopolitics. 
1. Perhaps the most salient feature present in Yoder’s vision of  ecclesial 
liminality is his ability to conjoin a strong notion of  exilic consciousness 
and identity with an attitude of  fundamental openness and patience. “My 
meeting the interlocutor on his own terms,” writes Yoder, “is not merely 
a matter of  accepting the minority’s conversational handicap although it is 
that. It is also a spirituality and a lifestyle.”42 To state it differently, Yoder’s 
pacifi st, postfoundationalist epistemology, one that I am sympathetic with, 
names a habit of  thinking that in its struggle for truth expresses itself  
through willingness to dialogue and in turn to be changed by that dialogue. 
In that sense, nonviolence not only represents an ethical stand, but also “an 
epistemology about how to let truth speak for itself.”43 “Because this Lord is 
the Lamb that was slain,” adds Yoder, “one should not coerce . . . persons to 
believe by using one’s overarching system any more than one should coerce 
people with superior weaponry.”44 Yoder’s whole life is a testament to the 
pursuit of  such a theological method.45 
The central axis around which such epistemology revolves is the focus 
on the “particularity of  Jesus and the universality of  truth.” In that regard, 
Yoder asks the following: “If  we cannot transcend the vulnerability of  belief  
by positing as accessible a nonparticular ‘natural,’ might we then celebrate 
confessionally that light and truth have taken on the vulnerability of  the 
particular?”46 Thus reminiscent of  Nietzsche’s perspectivism, he claims that 
“there is no ‘public’ that is not just another particular province.”47 Note 
42John Howard Yoder, “‘Patience’ as a Method of  Moral Reasoning: Is an Ethic 
of  Discipleship ‘Absolute’?” in The Wisdom of  the Cross: Essays in Honor of  John Howard 
Yoder, ed. Stanley Hauerwas, Chris K. Huebner, and Harry J. Huebner (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 28.
43Ibid.
44See Gerald W. Schalbach, “Anthology in Lieu of  System: John H. Yoder’s 
Ecumenical Conversations as Systematic Theology,” Mennonite Quarterly Review 71 
(1997): 306-307.
45For a good discussion of  the “dialogical vulnerability” in Yoder, see Chris 
K. Huebner, A Precarious Peace: Yoderian Explorations on Theology, Knowledge, and Identity 
(Scottdale: Herald, 2006), chap. 6. 
46John Howard Yoder, Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame: 
University of  Notre Dame Press, 1985), 44; quoted in P. Travis Kroeker, “The War of  
the Lamb,” in The New Yoder, ed. Peter Dula and Chris K. Huebner (Eugene: Cascade, 
2010), 103. For an important discussion of  particularity and violence, see James K. A. 
Smith, “The Logic of  Incarnation: Towards a Catholic Postmodernism,” in The Logic 
of  Incarnation: James K. A. Smith’s Critique of  Postmodern Religion, ed. Neal DeRoo and 
Brian Lightbody (Eugene: Pickwick, 2009).
47Yoder, Priestly Kingdom, 40. For an important discussion of  Yoder’s nonviolent 
epistemology, see Richard Bourne, Seek the Peace of  the City: Christian Political Criticism as 
Public, Realist, and Transformative (Eugene: Cascade, 2009), esp. chaps. 1 and 2.
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Yoder’s point on the possibility and importance of  pursuing different forms 
of  ad hoc correlations: 
We may be tactical allies of  the pluralist/relativist deconstruction of  
deceptive orthodox claims to logically coercive certainty, without making 
of  relativism itself  a new monism. We will share tactical use of  liberation 
language to dismantle the alliance of  church with privilege, without letting 
the promises made by some in the name of  revolution become a new 
opiate. For the reconstruction we shall fi nd other tactical allies. In the realm 
of  ethics we shall not grant, with Tolstoy and Reinhold Niebuhr, that to 
renounce violence is to renounce power. We may then fi nd tactical alliances 
with the Enlightenment . . . , or with the Gandhian vision, as did Martin 
Luther King, Jr.48
2. A remnant theology of  exile along the lines of  1 Peter and Yoder 
will always be clear about the ground of  its embodied difference. Exilic 
consciousness should not degenerate into forms of  self-infatuation—the 
tendency to clothe words like “prophetic” and “subversive” with an aura of  
“coolness”—or ideological allegiances that supplant Scripture as the true norma 
normata. Rather, diasporic difference is the socioethical shape that our love for 
God and our response to his calling and election take vis-à-vis the “city of  man” 
and its insatiable appetite for libido dominandi. Unfortunately, the language of  
difference as it is employed in the community of  faith too often refl ects a 
penchant for separatist fundamentalism, on the one hand, and various forms 
of  left-wing Constantinianism, on the other.49 Thus the focus on difference 
qua difference, detached from the broader narrative of  divine election and 
Christian apocalyptic, will always result in imbalance, co-opted radicalism, and 
captivity to “principalities and powers” in one form or another.
In contrast, I want to suggest, the Petrine delineation of  “diaspora 
consciousness,” as situated within God’s Trinitarian oikonomia (“God for us” in 
salvation history), transcends the usual dichotomies of  social/personal, theory/
practice, vita activa/vita contemplativa, and personal holiness/social justice. While 
I do admit of  the potential hubris involved in any tertium datur rhetoric—the 
sort of  locution that puts a favorable spin on the author’s ability to propose a 
mediating Aufhebung that somehow eludes everybody else’s visionary reach—I 
nevertheless want to state the need for a third-way Adventism that integrates 
these diverse elements. I think those were Bonhoeffer’s sentiments as well as 
he was hoping for the rise of  “a new type of  monasticism which has nothing 
in common with the old but a complete lack of  compromise in a life lived in 
accordance with the Sermon on the Mount in the discipleship of  Christ.”50
48Yoder, Priestly Kingdom, 62.
49For a description of  left-wing Constantinianism, see James K. Smith, The Devil 
Reads Derrida, and Other Essays on the University, the Church, Politics, and the Arts (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 105.
50Extract of  a letter written by Dietrich Bonhoeffer to his brother Karl-Friedrich 
on 14 January 1935 (London: 1933-1935, ed. Keith Clements, trans. Israel Best, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007], 285).
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3. An Adventist exilic ecclesiology will address frequent reductionisms of  
remnant identity to matters of  orthodoxy at the expense of  embodied social 
ethics. Ultimately, isn’t the concern for doctrinal purity at the expense—that 
qualifi er is critical—of  nonviolent witness itself  a legacy of  the Constantinian 
turn? In fact, what is it about our self-understanding that makes us more 
concerned about “tightening the language” of  Fundamental Belief  #6 dealing 
with the doctrine of  creation than the fact that we have national fl ags in our 
sanctuaries, or that we have honorary guards marching with bolt-action rifl es 
at church or university-sponsored events, or that we are mostly unperturbed 
by the denomination’s soft stand on right-to-life issues, or perhaps that we 
still have race-based administrative entities in our denomination?51 It seems 
to me that these questions cannot be forestalled through an appeal to 
benign pluralism or a tendency to relegate them to the level of  “individual 
conscience” as if  the resultant heterogeneity of  ethical positions would not 
somehow pertain to core issues of  remnant theology. 
The sad fact is—and I hope that my take here is not needlessly harsh— 
that Adventists regularly exhibit the troublesome trifecta of  expediency/
effectiveness, sentimentality/emotivism, and utilitarian thinking, which makes 
teaching ethics on college campuses, not to mention preaching in general, 
often such a disheartening endeavor. But teach and preach we must, of  
course, eagerly attending to the truth that the most fundamental shape of  the 
remnant church—the “fi rst philosophy” of  its theology and praxis—will have 
to be an unconditional commitment to nonviolence, compassion, forgiveness, 
and sanctity of  life.52 Let us thus forgo those attentions to doctrine, efforts 
to evangelize the world, and attempts to foster “revival and reformation” in 
our ranks—all of  them, of  course, important in themselves—that somehow 
neglect or minimize the above-stated commitments, or consign them to a 
second-tier importance. Rallying cries such as “Christ is coming soon” and 
“Let’s focus on Jesus” are certainly essential, very much so, as long as they 
don’t serve as proxies for cheap emotions in lieu of  obedient surrender and 
the willingness to imitate Jesus by taking his cross in all of  its “concrete social 
meanings” in “relation to enmity and power.”53
51For an important historical treatment of  these issues, see Douglas Morgan, 
Adventism and the American Republic: The Public Involvement of  a Major Apocalyptic Movement 
(Knoxville: University of  Tennessee Press, 2001).
52Note, e.g., David P. Gushee’s defi nition of  the sanctity of  life as the conviction 
that “all human beings, at any and every stage of  life, in any and every state of  
consciousness or self-awareness, of  any and every race, color, ethnicity, level of  
intelligence, religion, language, gender, character, behavior, physical ability/disability, 
potential, class, social status, etc., of  any and every particular quality of  relationship to 
the viewing subject, are to be perceived as persons of  equal and immeasurable worth 
and of  inviolable dignity and therefore must be treated in a manner commensurate 
with this moral status” (“Spiritual Formation and the Sanctity of  Life,” in Life in the 
Spirit: Spiritual Formation in Theological Perspective, ed. George Kalantzis and Jeffrey P. 
Greenman [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2010], 215).
53Yoder, The Politics of  Jesus, 131.
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Which brings us back to our discussion of  1 Peter, where the church 
is exhorted to the “good way of  life in Christ” and not “doing evil” (3:17). 
Harink in commenting on these words states that 
it is for the sake of  the world that the church offers its gracious, vulnerable, 
cruciform witness. But if  the church participates in the very ways of  the 
world that the gospel reveals as evil (manipulation, coercion, lying, mastery, 
abuse, revenge, violence, war), will not the judgment of  the world upon the 
church, in the form of  the world’s refusal of  the church’s message, itself  
be the form of  God’s judgment upon a church that has forgotten the true, 
cruciform scandal of  the gospel? As Peter says later, God’s judgment begins 
with the household of  God (4:17).54
4. Like diaspora Jews, Christians are called to live out their identity in a 
condition of  “cosmopolitan homelessness”55 and through an expression of  a 
“catholic personality”—in the sense of  belonging to a transethnic, transnational 
community of  believers—that is “not to be identifi ed with a particular spatio-
temporal regime.”56 After all, as Terry Eagleton reminds us, “God . . . takes 
little interest in countries. . . . He can’t be used as a totem or fetish in that way. 
He slips out of  your grasp if  you try to do so. His concern is with universal 
humanity, not with one particular section of  it.”57 Admittedly, some will 
object by saying that small dosages of  patriotism, the natural love for one’s 
country, is good for the Christian soul, that it fuels and possibly instills civic 
virtue and makes Olympic games medals a matter of  national pride. But how 
naive it is to think that such sentiments are sheltered from the encroachment 
of  forces—e.g., political, economic—that seek to hijack and manipulate them 
for their own ends; that they are somehow exempted from being one of  the 
many “principalities” marked by the condition of  the “Fall.”58 If  the twentieth 
54Harink, 96.
55John Howard Yoder, For the Nations: Essays Public and Evangelical (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 51. 
56Kroeker, 79.
57“Religion for Radicals: An Interview with Terry Eagleton” (http://blogs.ssrc.
org/tif/2009/09/17/religion-for-radicals-an-interview-with-terry-eagleton). For a 
helpful treatment of  this theme, see Ronald E. Osborn, Anarchy and Apocalypse: Essays 
on Faith, Violence, and Theodicy (Eugene: Cascade, 2010), chap. 5.
58For an important discussion on the issues of  principalities, see William 
Stringfellow, An Ethic for Christians and Other Aliens in a Strange Land (Eugene: Wipf  
& Stock, 2004), esp. chaps. 3 and 4. While not as well-known as Walter Wink’s work, 
Stringfellow offers some eye-opening insights on this topic. For example, he offers the 
following description of  the squalid and destructive tactics employed by principalities in 
their intersubjective and institutional manifestations: denial of  truth, doublespeak and 
overtalk, secrecy and boasts of  expertise, surveillance and harassment, exaggeration 
and deception, cursing and conjuring, usurpation and absorption, diversion and 
demoralization, and the violence of  babel such as “verbal infl ation, libel, rumor, 
euphemism and coded phrases, rhetorical wantonness, redundancy, hyperbole, . . . 
sophistry, jargon, noise, incoherence, . . . falsehood, blasphemy” (ibid., 97-114, 106).
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century has taught us anything, it must be the message that patriotism is never 
just patriotism, but rather a reservoir of  volatile sentiments, nitroglycerine of  
the soul to be handled with extreme care. As Foucault rightly reminds us, it 
is not that things are essentially bad; they are just always dangerous.59 Arne 
Rasmussen illustrates this point rather well: 
The events of  1914, which decisively shaped the twentieth century, are a 
formative and tragic example of  this relationship between material reality 
and imagination. How was it that German workers, allied with the aristocrats 
against whom they otherwise fought, enthusiastically (at fi rst) wanted to kill 
French workers because they lived on the other side of  a border, and vice 
versa? And how could German Christians, even German Catholics, want to 
do the same to French Christians/Catholics, and vice versa? Why did almost 
no church leader or theologian see this killing as a scandal?60
Sadly, the crafting of  such a catholic personality is rarely part of  
prebaptismal instruction as practiced in the Adventist church. Frequently, 
people are getting baptized without having undergone a thorough process 
of  initiation into the politics of  Jesus—“politics” in its root meaning having 
to do with “power, decision, and rank.”61 The reasons for that probably vary 
from context to context. It may have to do with the imbalance addressed 
above where the need to inculcate doctrinal correctness trumps everything 
else, or with the pressure to produce numbers, or with the recent (unbiblical) 
proliferation of  “second baptisms” as means of  reestablishing one’s 
relationship with Jesus, or with the pragmatic consideration of  assuring that 
our youth remain in the church. 
The point I want to make here, though, is that the way we go about 
baptisms, or rather the forms of  instructions associated with them, betrays a 
lack of  recognition that we fi nd ourselves in a post-Christendom environment 
that is more akin to what the early church was facing than the situation in 
eighteenth-, nineteenth-, or early twentieth-century America. In light of  this, 
shouldn’t things like the ethics of  life, the Sermon on the Mount, the issue of  
catholic identity as discussed above, the role of  nonviolence, the question of  
social and economic justice, sexual integrity in a pornographic age, practices 
of  forgiveness, and the place of  martyrdom take the central stage in baptismal 
instruction and a praxis-shaped apprenticeship as its corollary? Making people 
believe certain things, along with a few additional life-style changes, will not 
59Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 
1984), 85.
60Arne Rasmusson, “The Politics of  Diaspora,” in God, Truth, and Witness: Engaging 
Stanley Hauerwas, ed. L. Gregory Jones, Reinhard Hütter, and C. Rosalee Velloso Ewell 
(Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 90. See also Gerhard Lohfi nk, Does God Need the Church? 
Toward a Theology of  the People of  God (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 315.
61John Howard Yoder, The War of  the Lamb: The Ethics of  Nonviolence and Peacemaking, 
ed. Glenn Harold Stassen, Mark Thiessen Nation, and Matt Hamsher (Grand Rapids: 
Brazos, 2009), 80.
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do if  we are intent on nurturing strong Christian communities to serve as 
outposts of  God’s kingdom.62 
Conclusion
Much needs to be added to make this account of  ecclesial liminality more 
robust and, arguably, more dialectical. Other voices, particularly dissenting ones, 
need to be brought to the table. These caveats aside, I have tried to articulate a 
vision of  exilic consciousness that is true to the Adventist self-description of  
being a “peculiar people.” Taking my cue from Yoder, I have argued that such 
an understanding must imply the possibility of  adjudication and with it the 
recognition that some expressions of  Adventism are irreconcilably dissonant 
with the gospel. Heterogeneity at times is synonymous with peaceableness, 
magnanimous goodwill, and intellectual subtlety. However, it also can be 
an expression of  laziness, rabid self-interest, and indifference—a veritable 
seedbed for apostasy. In that sense, William Cavanaugh might or might not 
be right when he claims that “the full boundaries of  the church are never 
available to us.” But he certainly is correct when he adds that that “does not 
mean that the center is invisible as well”63 and that it cannot be named, in 
principle, over various other heterodox alternatives. 
Building on these fundamental commitments, I have sought to emphasize 
a more holistic understanding of  the remnant resting on an epistemology 
of  peace and a deep commitment to a nonviolent “messianic politics.” I 
have also suggested that in our post-Christendom era, theopolitical identity-
crafting and the formation of  an exilic consciousness should receive central 
attention not only in baptismal instruction, but also in other practices of  
ministry such as preaching, counseling, disciple-making, and various forms 
of  pastoral care. That is not to say that truth doesn’t matter—that would be 
alien to both the Adventist heritage and Scripture—and that it should not be 
intently struggled over, but only that such truth is only to be grasped as we 
commit ourselves to following in the footsteps of  Jesus. In the words of  the 
Moravian creed, “Vicit agnus noster, eum sequamur” (“Our Lamb has conquered, 
let us follow him”). 
62Alan Kreider makes the interesting observation that much of  what we consider to 
be the proper way of  conducting evangelism was simply absent from the early church. 
There were no evangelistic meetings per se, seeker-sensitive services were obviously 
unheard of, and the Great Commission was rarely referred to. After Nero’s persecution, 
in some places deacons would serve as bouncers, making sure that no unbaptized person 
would join worship service uninvited. And yet the church grew in leaps and bounds. 
How was that possible? Kreider explains that a strong notion of  both catholicity and 
exilic consciousness functioned as the key magnet for non-Christians. The rites of  
catechesis and baptisms were quite formidable, and yet that did not serve as a deterrent 
for the church’s incredible missionary expansion (“‘They Alone Know the Right Way to 
Live’: The Early Church and Evangelism,” in Ancient Faith for the Church’s Future, ed. Mark 
Husbands and Jeffrey P. Greenman [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2008]).
63Cavanaugh, 152. 
